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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.J .A.MES D. CHRISTENSEN AND

BETTY CHRISTENSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
11752

HENRY CORDOVA,
Defendant and Appellatnt.

BRIEF O,F RESP·ONDENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs filed this action against defendant to recoYer damages for personal injuries and property
damage. It is from the proceedings of the Court below
tlrnt defendant appeals.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs filed their action against defendant for
personal injury and property damage arising out of an
automobile accident that occurred on the 24th of August,
19G8. Defendant admitted liability and the issue of
(bmages was tried to the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
1

sitting without a jury. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of plaintiff Betty Christensen and against defendant for medical expenses in the sum of $998.29 and
general damages in the sum of $5,000.00, and in favor of
plaintiff James D. Christensen and against defendant
for the following amounts: Medical expenses $232.50,
property damage $393.64, and general damages in the
sum of $750.00.
The trial court refused to grant defendant a jury
trial, and defendant appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondents seek to have the action of the trial
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In order for the appellate court to fully understand
what has transpired in this case from its initiation to
the appeal, respondents will set out the facts in detail.
On the 24th day of August, 1968, at the intersection
of 2400 South Main, Bountiful, Davis County, Utah,
defendant drove his car into the rear of an automobile
owned and driven by plaintiff James D. Christensen,
and in which his wife was riding as a passenger (R. 1,
4). Both plaintiffs sustained bodily injury as a result
of the accident, and Mr. Christensen's automobile was
damaged.
At the time of the accident, plaintiffs were insured
under a policy of automobile liability insurance which
2

protected them against injury and damage from any
uninsured motorist (R. 14). On August 30, 1968, plaintiffs employed Mr. Carman E. Kipp of the firm of Kipp
and Christian to represent them in connection with filing
snit against Mr. Cordova for the injury and damage sustaied by them in the accident (R. 13). Accordingly, suit
·was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County
seeking damages for damage to plaintiffs' automobile
aud for bodily injury to plaintiff Betty Christensen, for
speeial medical and hospital expenses incurred and
general damages in the sum of $10,000.00 (R. 2). Defendant retained attorney Eldred J. Wilde to represent
him in defense of plaintiffs' action, and accordingly, an
ans·\Cn'r \Vas filed in his behalf on October 1, 1968 (R. 4).
On Odober 14, 1968, defendant, by and through his
conusel of record, admitted that on the day of the automobile accident in question he was not insured under any
policy of automobile liability insurance and was at that
time an uninsured motorist within the definition of that
term. A stipulation to that effect was filed by the parties
and made part of the court file and the record in this
rase (R. 5).
On November 22, 1968, Carman E. Kipp, as counsel
for plaintiffs, filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial requesting a non-jury trial and duly mailed a copy to
J%lred J. \Vilde, counsel for defendant, at his office, 616
.Judge Building, Salt Lake City (R. 7). Thereafter, on
N" ovember 25, 1968, and presumably after he had received plaintiffs' Notice of Readiness for Trial, Mr.
\Vilde, defendant's counsel, filed his Withdrawal of
')

"

Counsel which was received by the court on November
26. A copy of the withdrawal was mailed to plaintiff's
attorney on November 26 which was several days after
the filing of the Notice of Readiness for Trial (R. 6, 7).
The record in this matter shows that on March 20 1969
'
'
the District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Aldon J.
Anderson, set the matter for non-jury trial on June 24,
1969. Copies of the letter setting the case for trial were
sent to both l\lr. Kipp and l\lr. Wilde (R. 10).
In September of 1968, Mr. Frank Nichols of Frank
Xichols and Guiver Company, insurance adjusters, contacted ::\Ir. Kipp, plaintiffs' counsel, and advised him
that
L. D. vVrigley of C. W. Reese Company, insurance adjusters, 1vas the adjuster for Reserve Insurance
Compan}T on the claim for bodily injury sustained by
'both .Mr. and l\frs. Christensen under the uninsured
motorist provisions of their automobile liability insurance policy with that company (R. 14). Therefore, on
September 13, 1968, Mr. Kipp wrote a letter to Mr.
vVrigley advising him that an action had been filed by
the Christensens against Mr. Cordova. The letter also
advised the adjuster that Mr. Kipp was representing
ResenTe Insurance Company's insureds, and copies of
the Summons and Complaint were enclosed in the letter
along with a list of medical bills and other specials for
both plaintiffs incurred up to that itme (R. 14).
On numerous occasions thereafter, Mr. Kipp contacted .:\Ir. Wrigley or someone in the office of C. W.
Reese Company advising them of the status of the law-

suit and furnishing them with up to date medical specials
as ineurred by both plaintiffs and supplying them with
cnrrent medical reports (R. 14). As a part of the contirmous contact between Mr. Kipp and the adjuster, Mr.
Wrigley, on behalf of the company, requested that both
::\Ir. allcl :Mrs. Christensen submit to an independent
medic·al examination by Dr. Reed Clegg. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs were examined by Dr. Clegg and copies of
the metlical report were sent to the adjuster. A copy of
the stipulation between plaintiffs and defendant wherein
Mr. Cordova admitted that he did not have automobile
insurance at the time the accident occurred was
sent to the adjuster (R. 14).
On two occasions, Reserve Insurance Company, by
and through its adjuster, requested that Mr. Kipp submit
an off er of settlement on the claims of both plaintiffs.
Offers to settle were submitted to the company pursuant
to both requests, neither of which was accepted and withnnt any counter-offer having been made by the company
(R.15).

On or about June 18, 1969, Reserve Insurance Comemployed Mr. L. E. :Midgley to represent defendant
HemY Confo\'a because of the uninsured motorist pro\'i sion in the policy issued to plaintiffs, and on that day,
::.rr. l\Iidgley filed a Demand and Motion for Jury Trial
and mailed a copy of same to plaintiffs' attorneys. The
::.Iotion for a Jury Trial was resisted by counsel for
plaiHtiff who aclYised the presiding judge, Bryant Croft,
of th0 matters essentially set forth in the statement of
5

facts herein. Plaintiffs' counsel was instructed to file
his affidavit setting forth the facts as related at the
hearing on the motion. The affidavit was filed (R. 1315), and the 1\f otion for a Jury Trial was denied on June
23, 1969 (R. 12). Defendant did not file his counter
affidavit to the assertions made by plainitff s' counsel
as to what the facts were in this matter, nor did he request permission to file one.
The case was tried on June 24, 1969, before the
Honorable Stewart .M. Hanson, sitting without a jury.
At the commencement of the trial, Mr. Midgley, counsel
for the insurance company and defendant, admitted
liability on the part of Mr. Cordova. Plaintiffs' counsel
made a motion to include the bodily injury claim of plaintiff James D. Christensen for trial, which motion was
granted over Mr. Midgley's objection (R. 17).
Counsel for the insurance company and Mr. Cordova <lid not call any witnesses at the trial b1;J.t contented
himself with cross-examining plaintiffs' witnesses. Dr.
Reed Clegg, who performed the independent medical
examination on behalf of the insurance company, was
not called by the company's counsel to reveal to the
court his findings as to the nature and extent of the injuries of both plaintiffs.
It is from the court's refusal to grant a jury trial
m this action that Reserve Insurance Company prosecutes this appeal.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED
TO BE CORRECT BY THE REVIEWING
COURT ON APPEAL.
The cases overwhelmingly support the general
1•roposition of law stated in Point I., and especially as it
avplies to the instant case. No cases have been found by
respomlents stating a contrary position.
Not only is there a presumption of validity on apIJl·a l of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court,
but the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to
dC'monstrate error, and in the absence of such the judgment must be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead
c. Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2
U.2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Again, on appeal the judgment
of the trial court is presumptively correct and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate
court in favor of it. Burton v. Zions Co-operative Mercantile l11stitution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514; Nagle v.
Club Fontainblue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty v.
Oinrly Jlanufacturing Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, 404 P.2d
30.
This proposition of law is correct and is binding up011 the appellate court whether the proceedings in the
1<>1Yer court are before a judge only or a judge and jury.
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton 1·. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176; Universal In-
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restmeut Company v. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d
364; Taylor 1:. Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 398 P.2d 382; Wendr:lboe v. Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 178; Hadley v.
TVood, 9 U.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197; Daisy Distributors, Inc.,
Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, 1¥ estern Conference
(If Teamsters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT A JURY TRIAL.
Rule 38 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
''Any party may demand a trial by jury of
any issue triable of right by a jury by paying the
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time
after the commencement of the action and not
later than shall be fixed by rule of the court in
-.,yhich the action is pending. Such demand may be
endorsed upon a pleading of the party.''
This particular provision reserving the right to a
trial of any issue triable of right by a jury not to he in
conflict with the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Sec. 10. State v. Cherry, 22 Utah 1, 60 Pac. 1103.

It is obvious, then, that the failure of a party to pay
the statutory jury fee and make his demand for a jury
trial in accordance with the rules promulgated by the
court where the action is pending constitutes a waiver
hy that party of a trial by jury. Rule 38(d), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
8

In the instant case, plaintiffs counsel filed a Notice
of Headiness for Trial demanding that the matter be set
for 11011-jury trial. A copy of said notice was duly mailed
to Eldred .J. -Wilde at his office on November 22, 1968
( R. 17). It is important to note that Mr. Wilde was still
acting as defendant's attorney at that time. He did not
file his withdrawal as counsel until November 25, 1968
(R. 6). There can be no doubt that defendant was put
on notice that plaintiff demanded a non-jury trial and
certainly at that time he took no action to demand a jury
trial.
Subsequently, and on March 20, 1969, the District
Court of Salt Lake County, the court in which the case
\ms pending, sent notice to both parties by sending said
notice to their respective counsel, and in the case of defendant, his last known counsel, which notice provided
in part as follows:
" * * * This matter is set for a non-jury trial
unless the jury fee has been paid heretofore. If
a jury trial is desired, the statutory fee must be
paid no later than ten days from the date of this
letter, with notice thereof being served on opposing counsel.
Very truly yours,
s/ Aldon J. Anderson
Aldon J. Anderson
Presiding Judge
Courtroom No. 9
5th Floor, Courts Building
240 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
AJA:mts
cc: Eldred J. Wilde
616 Judge Building"
9

\Yhether or not Mr. Wilde advised defendant of his
receipt of the notice from the District Court is not
known; however, the court acted properly in sending the
noitce to Mr. Wilde since he was defendant's last known
attorney and no notice had been sent to either plaintiffs
or the court of the appearance of or the name and address of new counsel.
Title 78-51-34, Utah Code Annotated, J953, provides
as follows:
''Change of attorney.-The attorney in any
, ' action or special proceeding may be changed at
. any time before judgment or final determination
as follows:
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk
or entered upon the minutes.

v

(2) * * * * * "

. '1 _ The next following section of the Code, Title 78-513::>, states:

\

\

'' Effect-Notice of change.-When an attorney is changed as provided in the next preceding section, written notice of the change and
of the substitution of a new attorney or of the
appearance of the party in person must be given
to the adverse party; until then he must recognize
the former attorney.''

Tlw record shows that Eldred Wilde, defendant's
attnruey, voluntarily withdrew as counsel for Mr. CorcloYa pursuant to 78-51-34(1), Utah Code Annotated,
1053. :\fter his withdrawal and until Mr. Midgley appeared as counsel for defendant, both the court and
plaintiffs counsel were compelled to recognize Eldred

10

-Wilde as attorney for defendant pursuant to 78-51-35,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This was necessitated by
the failure of defendant and Reserve Insurance Company to notify counsel or the court of the name and address of defendant's new lawyer. As a matter of fact,
neither l\Ir. Cordova nor Reserve Insurance Company
were interested enough to even bother about new counsel
for defendant until sunrise of the trial day.
In the case of Salina Canyon Coal Company v.
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161, the Utah Supreme
Court held, on construing the provisions of 78-51-35,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that an attorney who has
appeared for a party in a case may be treated as such
by opposing counsel until opposing counsel are notified
by the dismissal or change of attorneys. A Notice of
Appeal
served upon
that shall be sufficient notice to the opposite party.
Title 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not
in point or controlling in this case since Mr. Cordova's
attorney, Eldred Wilde, did not die, nor was he removed
as counsel, nor was he suspended from the practice of
law, nor did he cease to act as an attorney. H e on1y
ceased to act as attorney for defendant while remaining ,...
actiYely engaged in the practice of law.
Our high court has also addressed itself to the problem of interpreting 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. )
In the case of Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West,
'.20 U.2d 292, 437 P.2d 214, the court held that this par- )
ticular statute did not entitle defendant to have a de11

:...
_.,..,r

..r' ...

fault judgment set aside which had been taken against
him when his attorney withdrew even though plaintiff
had not demanded that defendant get new counsel and
there was nothing in the record to indicate that defendant's withdrawing counsel had died, was removed or
w<ls suspended from the practice of law.
Plaiutiff s could not agree with defendant more
when he states the law to the effect that where a demand
for a jury trial is not timely made, it is in the sound
discretion of the trial court as to whether a belated
demand for a jury trial will be granted. Thompson L'.
A11rlersoJ1, 107 Utah 331, 133 P.2d 665; Hunter c.
Michaels, 11± Utah 242, 198 P.2d 245; TV ebb L'. TV ebb,
116 rtah 115, 209 P.2d 201 ;Farmers and Merchants
Bank 1·.
C.l.T., 4 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127;
Sweeney c. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U.2d 113, 417 P.2d 126.
Defendant, :l\Ir. Cordova, was not without counsel
on the day that the Notice of Readiness for Trial was
filed. :'.\Ir. Cordova knew that his counsel had withdrawn
for he received a copy of the Notice of Withdrawal on
Xovember 25, 1968, the same clay it was mailed to plaintiffs' counsel. Uncloubteclly, jfr. -Wilde advised clefe11clm1t of the X otice of Readiness that had been filed.
X either j[r. Corclo\'a nor Reserve Insurance Company,
his alter 0go, took any action to have new counsel app1Jintec1 for clefenclant until five days before the trial.
Until then the court ancl counsel for plaintiffs recognized Eldred \;fikle as defendant's attorney.

12

After sitting on their hands for some seven months,
the insurance company breathlessly rushed into court
on June 20, 1969, waving its legal arms shouting platitudes about the right of defendant to a jury trial. It
is interesting that the company had never shown so
much interest before in the rights of Mr. Cordova and
rYen before hiring :Mr. Midgley it reserved its rights
under the Christensen policy giving it the right to
recover against
Cordova any amount the company
is required to pay plaintiffs.
This is a strange relationship indeed unless we
realize that Reserve Insurance Company is not at all
concerned about the rights of the uninsured defendant
hut only with what result will ultimately affect its inner
pocket.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT, BY RECEIPTING
HIS
'S NOTICE OF WITHDRAvV AL, WAS NOT DEEMED TO BE APPEARING PRO SE, AND FAILURE TO
GIVE HIM NOTICE OF ALL SUBSEQUENT
PROCEEDINGS WAS NOT REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
In the interest of brevity, plaintiffs incorporate the
applicable and relevant portions of Point II into Point
1TI of this brief.
Defendant's point that after the withdrawal of his
eounsel he was deemed to be appearing pro se and it
was error to fail to personally give him notice of all

13

subsequent proceedings is not well taken. The law and
discussion under Point II of this brief is cited and especially as that discussion relates to 78-51-34, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
But the gut issue in this case is not at all whether
l\Ir. Cordova had notice of the trial setting but whether
Reserve Insurance Company was aware of the status
of the case at all times. Mr. Cordova never employed an
attorney to represent him after Eldred Wilde withdrew
as his counsel. He did not approach the insurance company and request that it obtain legal help to assist him
in his defense of this case. The company contacted him,
explained to defendant what it proposed to do and the
greatest effort to which it could spur defendant was to
merely ohtain his consent to having the insurance compm1y 's attorney represent him.
Surely Mr. Cordova was advised by the company
that he would be protected from plaintiffs' claim and
that it would employ their counsel to do it. However,
the company, while assuring defendant that in the interests of justice it would protect the downtrodden and
the uninsured, especially if the company could be injured in any way by its not doing so, and at the same ·
time reserved its right to collect from this same downtn 1dd0n and uninsured any amount that his savior should
lian· to pay plaintiffs.
The statements in Appellant's Brief to the con- '
trnry notwithstanding, we are confronted here, not with
:\fr. Cordova, hut with Rc>serve Insurance Company who
14

was not responsible enough to reject the offers of settlement solicited from plaintiffs' counsel or to make a
counter-offer.
One more interesting aspect of the case should be
noted here. Appellant has made no issue with the amount
of the judgment awarded plaintiffs and has therefore
impliedly admitted that the amount awarded was rea.-;onahle-and so it 'vas. Other than having the case tried
hy a jury, appellant makes no claim of any prejudicial
error in the trial. Defendant does not contend that if
the matter is remanded for a jury trial that the amount
of damages will be less than awarded by the court. Certai11ly he could not hope to have eight just men and
true pass on the liability of the case since counsel for the
iwmrance company admitted liability at the trial.
It is obvious that a new trial would achieve nothing
1mt a multiplicity of suits.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERRONPERMIT PLAINTIFF JAMES D.
CHRISTENSEN ADD A CLAIM OF PERSON AL INJURIES AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL.
Again it should be pointed out that we are here
discussing Reserve Insurance Company and not Mr.
( 'orclova. In this case, judgment has been entered against
defendant but no effort has been made by plaintiffs to
...:;1tisfy the judgment against him even though no super-;edeas boml has been filed in this matter. Plaintiffs have

15

an msnrance policy with Reserve Insurance Company
whereby the company agrees to pay plaintiffs for damages caused to them by any uninsured motorist. Mr. Cordova is uninsured. The amount of the judgment is within the policy limits of the uninsured motorist coverage
provided. How says, then, appellant that the company
is not involved. It is attempting to disguise, hide and
mingle its monetary interests with those of an uninsured
and probably impecunious individual in order to gain
sympathy for its dollar position.
After plaintiffs' counsel filed the complaint setting
forth the bodily injury claim of plaintiff Betty Christensen and the property damage claim of plaintiff James
D. Christensen, Mr. L. D. "\Vrigley, the company's adjuster, was notified of the bodily injury claim of Mr.
Christensen. Copies of medical bills and reports on Mrs.
Christensen were mailed to the adjuster. On behalf of
the company, he demanded an independent medical examination on both plaintiffs by a doctor of the company's choosing. Twice the adjuster requested that off0rs of settlement be made for the claims of both plaintiffs and twice offers were made. On neither occasion
c1icl the off er generate a yea or nay from the Company.

It is not kno-v\·n hy counsel for plaintiffs whether
-:\Ir. Midgley was employed by L. D ...Wrigley, the adjuster, or directly by the company. In either event, he
'rnnld have the company's file on the whole case which
·w<mld r0vcal the contents of the adjuster's file. Ho\Y
says appellant, then, that the claim for bodily injury of

plaintiff James D. Christensen came as a bolt out of the
blue so that the company's counsel was shocked into
insensibility at the trial and was caused to stumble about
the court room in wonder and amazement at the recent
turn of events.
Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the real party in
interest in this case, Reserve Insurance Company, was
well aware of the bodily injury claim of Mr. Christensen
and certainly well knew that such a claim would be
asserted at the trial and that because of its course of
rondurt with plaintiffs' counsel, waived its right to resist the presentation of said claim at that time and is
Pstopped from so resisting it.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument, plaintiffs urge the Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court and award plaintiffs their costs
expended on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, ESQ.
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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